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Mistreating a Symptom: The Legitimizing of
Mandatory, Indefinite Commitment of Insanity
Acquittees - Jones v. United States
At the end of the 1982 term, in Jones v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia statute requiring the auto-
matic and indefinite commitment of persons acquitted by reason of in-
sanity. While under the D.C. statute the acquittee is periodically given the
opportunity to gain release, the practice of involuntarily confining some-
one who has been acquitted raises serious due process and equal protec-
tion issues. This note examines the Court's analysis of these issues,
focusing on a comparison of the elements necessary for an insanity defense
with the showing required by the due process clause for involuntary civil
commitment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception,' the marriage of psychiatry and law embod-
ied in the insanity defense has been the source of intense ideolog-
ical debate. While the legislatures and the judiciary have been
called upon to resolve such complex issues as the definition of
sanity itself, the most difficult issue associated with the defense 2
is the disposition of the person acquitted by reason of insanity.
The insanity acquittee is in a peculiar position. Although the
acquittal signifies a lack of criminal responsibility, precluding
punishment, assertion of the defense is tantamount to an admis-
sion that the defendant committed the criminal act in question.
1. The precise origins of the insanity defense are unknown. While legal theo-
rists such as Braxton and Coke had reflected upon the effects of insanity on crimi-
nal responsibility, it was not until the late eighteenth century that the insanity
defense gained wide judicial acceptance. See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, THE IN-
SANITY DEFENSE 9-11 (1967).
2. The American Law Institute Model Penal Code test for insanity used by
the federal courts and about one-half of the states, provides: "A person is not re-
sponsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 401 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Most of the remaining states use the M'Naghten test which focuses on whether
the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as to not know the nature and quality of his action; or, if he did know, he did not
know that what he was doing was wrong. American Bar Association, The Insanity
Defense ABA and APA Proposals for Change, 7 MENrAL DISAB. L. REP. 136-38
(1983).
This admission makes immediate release of the acquittee un-
palatable as a matter of public policy. Detention of the insanity
acquittee solely on the basis of his successful assertion of the de-
fense, however, is difficult to justify according to legal theory. The
insanity acquittee has neither been convicted nor adjudged civilly
insane.3
The response of the state legislatures to this dilemma has been
varied. Some have chosen to enact criminal commitment stat-
utes, while others have left the problem to the courts. 4 Of the var-
3. Civil commitment refers to the process by which one thought to be men-
tally ill is committed to a state mental hospital. The process includes protection of
the individual's due process rights, notably the right to a jury trial with the state
bearing the burden of proving, by "clear and convincing" evidence, the defendant's
insanity and dangerousness. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-33 (1979);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 (1975).
4. The commitment provisions of state law concerning persons acquitted due
to insanity can be grouped into four categories. The first includes those which rec-
ognize automatic commitment following an acquittal based on the insanity de-
fense. As of 1981, ten jurisdictions had such laws. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-105
(1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §403(a) (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301(d)(1)
(1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503(d) (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(1) (Supp.
1979); LA. CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 654 (West Supp. 1980) (capital cases); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 103 (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(1) (Vernon Supp.
1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.521(1) (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(1) (West 1971).
The following is an example of one such statute: "When a defendant is acquit-
ted on the ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, the court
shall order such person to be committed to the director of the department of
mental health for custody, care, and treatment in a state mental hospital." Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 552.040(1) (emphasis added).
The second category includes those which give the trial court discretion in de-
ciding whether and where to confine the defendant. Twelve states have adopted
some form of this approach. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-612(1)(a) (1983); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1980); FLA. R. Crim. P. 394.467 (Supp. 1983); HAwAi REV.
STAT. § 813.2, Rule 21 (West 1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 12, § 170 (1982); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-13-7 (1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:9 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:4-8 (West 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.325 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5
(Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.110 (1980); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-306
(1977).
The third category includes those states which allow a temporary commitment
of insanity acquittees pending a full hearing on their present mental state. Eleven
states have such laws. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.090 (1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-47 (West Supp. 1984); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 654 (West Supp. 1980)
(non-capital cases); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 16 (West Supp. 1983-84);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 14.800(1050) (1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-301 (1979);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2203 (1979); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 330.20 (McKinney Supp.
1984); R.I. GEN. LAws § 40.1-5.3-4(b)-(d) (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-709
(Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-3 (1980).
The fourth category includes those states which require the individual's disposi-
tion under the general civil commitment law of the state. Fifteen states have
adopted this approach. ALA. CODE § 2252-33 (1975); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 25 (1973); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-4 (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
5-2-5 (Burns 1979); MiNN. R. CrM. P. 20.02 (8) (West 1979 & 1984); N.M. R. CRIM. P.
35(2) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-10 (Supp.
1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(A) (Baldwin 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1161 (West Supp. 1983-84); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7406 (Purdon Supp. 1984); S.C.
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ious schemes adopted, those which require automatic
commitment have most often been the subject of constitutional
attack on due process or equal protection grounds.5
On November 2, 1983, amidst the heated public, professional,
and legislative debates regarding the insanity defense sparked by
the Hinckley 6 verdict announced only four months earlier, the
United States Supreme Court heard arguments for the case of
Jones v. United States.7 The Jones case presented a challenge to
the District of Columbia's mandatory commitment statute regard-
ing insanity acquittees.8 In a surprising departure from a line of
CODE ANN. § 44-23-610 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12
(Supp. 1983); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 46.03. § 4(a) (Vernon 1979); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4820(4) (1974), 4822 (Supp. 1983).
5. The equal protection argument is that insanity acquittees should be given
the procedural safeguards provided in the civil commitment context because there
is no rational basis for distinguishing between civil commitment and commitment
of insanity acquittees. The due process argument rests principally on Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In Addington the Supreme Court held that the due
process clause requires the government, in a civil commitment proceeding, to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is presently
both mentally ill and dangerous. It is claimed these standards are not met by an
insanity acquittal because there is no finding of present mental illness and danger-
ousness. See United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bolton v. Har-
ris, 395 F. 2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Colorado v. Fetty, 650 P.2d 541 (Colo. 1982)
(Colorado Supreme Court rejects equal protection argument challenging auto-
matic commitment); In re Downing, 103 Idaho 689, 652 P.2d 193 (1982); State v.
Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975). See also German & Singer, Punishing the Not
Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUrGERs L.
REV. 1011 (1976).
6. The New York Times reported a "chorus of outrage from Reagan adminis-
tration officials and others" in response to Hinckley's acquittal. N.Y. Times, June
23, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 1. On Capitol Hill, the acquittal provoked outbursts of rage
accompanied by demands for revision of the insanity defense. The demands for
action were reinforced by Attorney General William French Smith who said:
' There must be an end to the doctrine that allows so many persons to commit
crimes of violence, to use confusing procedures to their own advantages, and then
to have the door open for them to return to the society they victimized." N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1982, § 3, at 6, col. 1. Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, added: 'This case has demonstrated, over the many
weeks of conflicting 'expert' testimony, that there is something fundamentally
wrong with the modern insanity defense." Id.
7. 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
8. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(1) (1981) provides:
If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense raises
the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he was
insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospital
for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant to
this subsection or subsection (e). . ..
Id. Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible only if the defend-
earlier decisions 9 evincing increased concern for the procedural
rights of the mentally ill caught up in the criminal justice system,
the Court rejected petitioner's claim that the statute was uncon-
stitutional and held that a finding of "not guilty of a crime by rea-
son of insanity" was a constitutionally adequate basis for
involuntary, indefinite commitment of the acquittee to a mental
hospital.10
After examining the tumultuous development of the law regard-
ing disposition of insanity acquittees in the District of Columbia,
this note will analyze the Jones decision and its impact on future
legislation, including reforms proposed in response to the Hinck-
ley verdict.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
More than any other court, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has paid close attention to the
issues concerning the insanity acquittee and has generated sev-
eral influential opinions in this area of the law." Because of its
compelling analysis of these constitutional issues and the fact
that courts across the nation frequently refer to its analysis when
considering similar provisions, it is necessary to examine the de-
velopment of criminal commitment laws in the District of Colum-
bia Circuit leading up to the Jones decision.
Prior to 1954, disposition of insanity acquittees in the District of
Columbia was left to the discretion of the trial judge. In that year,
however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
decided Durham v. United States12 in which the M'Naghten test
for criminal culpability was replaced by the broader Durham rule.
This broader insanity test, in conjunction with judicial discretion
over the disposition of the insanity acquittee, was seen by many
as increasing the opportunities for otherwise guilty defendants to
ant himself raised the insanity defense. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 706,
720 (1962).
9. See infra note 18.
10. 103 S. Ct. at 3052 (acquittee will be confined until he has regained his san-
ity or is no longer a danger to himself or society).
11. See United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bolton v. Harris,
395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
12. In Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), a new test of re-
sponsibility was announced which later became known as the Durham rule. The
opinion, written by Chief Judge Bazelon (who later wrote the Bolton opinion),
stated that "[aJn accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or defect." Id. at 874-75. The new standard was admit-
tedly designed to broaden the class of persons who would be treated instead of
punished and to facilitate communication between psychiatric experts and the
courts. See Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity
Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 941 (1961).
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go free. Congress responded by imposing mandatory commit-
ment on all insanity acquittees with release dependent upon an
order of the court, based on certification by a hospital administra-
tor that the patient had recovered and was no longer dangerous.'3
The constitutionality of these procedures was soon challenged.
These challenges were based on the argument that insanity ac-
quittees, in having been involuntarily committed without the pro-
cedural protections afforded civil committees, were denied equal
protection of the laws.14 The District of Columbia Circuit initially
rejected this argument and upheld the mandatory commitment
statute, justifying the difference in procedures on the notion that
insanity acquittees were "an exceptional class [of people]" and
that their hospitalization prevented the public from further dan-
gerous acts and promoted their own recovery.' 5
The Supreme Court, recognizing the potential for abuse of the
commitment provision by the prosecution, imposed limitations on
mandatory commitment in Lynch v. Overholser. 16 In that case,
the Court ruled that the statute could only require automatic
commitment of those acquittees who themselves raised the in-
sanity defense. It could not be applied to defendants, like Lynch,
who raised the defense at the suggestion of the prosecutor.17
The Court chose not to decide the case on the broader basis of
13. See supra note 7.
14. The challenges are also often based on a due process argument which es-
sentially duplicates the equal protection argument. As the Court in Jones noted,
"[ijf the Due Process Clause does not require that an insanity acquittee be given
the particular procedural safeguards provided in a civil-commitment hearing...
then there necessarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for distin-
guishing between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees." 103
S. Ct. at 3048 n.10. See also Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d
667 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
15. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d at 949. The appellant had been charged
with robbery and was found not guilty by reason of insanity. He had a history of
significant mental aberration and irrational violence toward himself and others.
Id. at 944.
16. 369 U.S. 705 (1962). After petitioner received treatment in a mental hospi-
tal, a psychiatrist advised the court that he was able to stand trial, but that he was
suffering from a mental disease. When petitioner was brought to trial on two
charges of passing bad checks, the judge refused to allow him to plead guilty. Al-
though petitioner maintained that he was mentally responsible when the offenses
were committed and presented no evidence of his insanity, the judge found him
not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered him committed to a mental hospital
under D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d).
17. 369 U.S. at 710.
an equal protection argument.18 This caused some lower courts,
including the District of Columbia Circuit, to read Lynch as an
implicit rejection by the Supreme Court of the equal protection
challenge to automatic commitment.19 Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, however, seemed to support the opposite view
that insanity acquittees are entitled to the same procedural safe-
guards afforded people being civilly committed.20 The first, and
most important of these cases, is Baxstrom v. Herold.21
In Baxstrom, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
New York statute which allowed a person to be civilly committed
to a mental hospital at the expiration of a prison term without the
jury review available to all other civil committees and without a
judicial determination that he was dangerously mentally ill.22
The Court held that there was no justifiable basis for the differ-
ence in commitment procedures and, therefore, petitioner's equal
protection rights had been violated.23
Although the Baxstrom decision did not specifically address the
issue of insanity acquittees, lower courts have applied the Bax-
strom principle in cases involving the disposition of defendants
found not guilty by reason of insanity.24 This is what Chief Judge
18. Id. at 711. The Court seemed to assume that the equal protection clause
would not prevent an insanity acquittee from being subject to mandatory
confinement.
19. See supra note 7.
20. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (procedural due process requires that a
commitment hearing precede a prisoner's transfer to a mental hospital); Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (indefinite commitment of a person based solely on
incompetency to stand trial held to violate equal protection); Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 504 (1972) (statute allowing commitment, in lieu of sentencing, for sex of-
fenses violates equal protection); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (alterna-
tive sentencing to an indefinite term in Colorado's "sex deviate facility" denies
due process); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (differences in commitment
procedures for convicts and civil committees violates equal protection clause).
21. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). Baxstrom, while incarcerated in a New York prison,
was certified insane by a prison physician. He was then transferred from prison to
Dannemora State Hospital, an institution under the jurisdiction and control of the
New York Department of Correction. Dannemora's director filed a petition in the
Surrogate's Court stating that Baxstrom's sentence was expiring and requested
that he be civilly committed under section 384 of the N.Y. Correction Law. A pro-
ceeding was held at which the state submitted medical evidence which stated that,
in the opinion of the state's physicians, Baxstrom was still mentally ill and in need
of hospitalization for psychiatric treatment. Baxstrom had no counsel at this hear-
ing. It was determined, nonetheless, that Baxstrom would remain at Dannemora
after the expiration of his prison term on December 18, 1961. He remained there
until the Supreme Court decision in February 1966.
22. Id. at 115.
23. Id. at 114-15. The Supreme Court found that convicted criminals who are
determined to be insane are not such "an exceptional class [of people]" as to jus-
tify a difference in commitment procedures.
24. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). New Jersey has interpreted
Baxstrom and Jackson similarly in State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 251, 344 A.2d 289, 297
(Vol. 11: 569, 1984] Jones v. United States
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Bazelon did writing for the District of Columbia Circuit in the
landmark case of Bolton v. Harris. Chief Judge Bazelon wrote:
It is true that persons acquitted by reason of insanity have committed
criminal acts and that this fact may tend to show they meet the require-
ments for [civil] commitment, namely, illness and dangerousness. But it
does not remove these requirements. Nor does it justify total abandon-
ment of the procedures used in civil commitment proceedings to deter-
mine whether these same requirements have been satisfied. Hence,
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity must be given a judicial
hearing with procedures substantially similar to those in civil commit-
ment proceedings. 2 5
The Bolton decision had the effect of wiping out mandatory
commitment in the District of Columbia, replacing it with a post-
trial commitment proceeding. Congress quickly responded with
legislation designed to circumscribe the judicially-created com-
mitment procedure. This was done through significant amend-
ments to the District of Columbia Criminal Code, the most
important of which shifted the burden of proof on the issue of
commitment, following an insanity acquittal, from the District to
the acquittee.2 6 Rather than requiring the District to establish the
requirements for involuntary civil commitment, the new legisla-
tion provided for automatic commitment and put the burden on
the acquittee to satisfy the requirements for his release. In es-
(1975): "[TIhe Supreme Court in [Baxstrom and Jackson] has plainly attempted
to enunciate a broad principle-that the fact that the person to be committed has
previously engaged in criminal acts is not a constitutionally acceptable basis for
imposing upon him a substantially different standard or procedure for involuntary
commitment."
25. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d at 651.
26. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (2) provides, in relevant part:
(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) . . . shall have a hear-
ing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to determine
whether he is entitled to release from custody....
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause notice of the
hearing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting at-
torney and hold the hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing
was begun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact
and conclusions of law with respect thereto. The person confined shall
have the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody,
either conditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as
may appear appropriate.
Id.
The statute does not specify the standard for determining release, but the court
of appeals in Bolton held that as in release proceedings under section 24-301(e)
and section 21-545(b), the confined person must show that he is either no longer
mentally ill or no longer dangerous to himself or others in the community. See
Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364, 372 & n.16 (D.C. 1981) (en banc).
sence, Congress reestablished the mandatory commitment proce-
dure held unconstitutional in Bolton.
Following Congress' circumscription of the Bolton decision, two
Supreme Court cases were decided which reinforced the position
taken by Judge Bazelon and seemed to foreshadow the demise of
the District of Columbia commitment statute.
The first of these cases, Jackson v. Indiana, 2 7 involved the inde-
terminate commitment of a deaf mute to a mental health institu-
tion on the basis of a finding that he was incompetent to stand
trial.28 The examining psychiatrist's report indicated that there
was little likelihood of improvement in Jackson's condition.29
Jackson's counsel argued that his "commitment under these cir-
cumstances amounted to a 'life sentence' without his ever having
been convicted of a crime," and therefore deprived Jackson of his
fourteenth amendment rights to due process and equal
protection. 30
The Supreme Court first addressed the equal protection argu-
ment. Relying on Baxstrom, the Court held that Jackson was de-
nied equal protection by his commitment to an institution without
a judicial determination of his dangerousness, as is afforded civil
committees. Referring to Baxstrom's commitment, the Court
held: "If criminal conviction and imposition of sentence are insuf-
ficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection
against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all
others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice." 3 1
In regard to Jackson's due process rights, the Court held that
his commitment was ordered without consideration of any of the
criteria necessary to justify the exercise of Indiana's power of in-
definite commitment: "At the least, due process requires that the
nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable rela-
tion to the purpose for which the individual is committed."32 The
Jackson decision not only strengthened the Baxstrom principle,
but the opinion included a specific approval of Judge Bazelon's
extension of the principle to commitment of insanity acquittees in
Bolton v. Harris. 33
The latest Supreme Court decision expressing a more favorable
27. 406 U.S. 715.
28. Id. at 718.
29. Id. at 718-19. The doctor's report showed that Jackson's condition pre-
cluded his understanding the nature of the charges against him or participating in
his defense. Jackson's intelligence was said not to be sufficient to enable him to
develop the necessary communication skills.
30. Id. at 719.
31. Id. at 724.
32. Id. at 738.
33. Id. at 724. The Court also cited People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 37, 224 N.E.2d 87,
[Vol. 11: 569, 1984] Jones v. United States
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attitude toward the mentally ill criminal offender is Vitek v.
Jones.34 In Vitek, a convicted felon was transferred from a state
prison to a mental hospital pursuant to section 83-180(1) of the
Revised Statutes of Nebraska.35 The prisoner challenged the con-
stitutionality of the statute on procedural due process grounds.
The Court held that procedural due process requires that a com-
mitment hearing precede a prisoner's involuntary transfer to a
mental hospital.36 The Court distinguished punishment for crime
and commitment for mental illness, and noted that the latter in-
vokes specific procedural guarantees. 37
Although none of the Baxstrom-Vitek line of Supreme Court
decisions directly address the issue of commitment standards for
insanity acquittees, many lower courts have interpreted these
cases as requiring substantially equivalent procedures for com-
mitment of insanity acquittees and those individuals civilly com-
mitted.38 Legislative enactments in this area, prior to the public
outcry in response to the Hinckley verdict, seemed to follow this
trend.39 Since the Hinckley verdict, however, forty bills to abolish
or reform the insanity defense have come under congressional
consideration. Legislatures in many states are also considering
277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966), as support. 406 U.S. at 724. It also noted its own extension
of Baxstrom in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). 406 U.S. at 724-25.
34. 445 U.S. 480.
35. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-180(1) (1979) provides:
When a physician designated by the Director of Correctional Services
finds that a person committed to the department suffers from a physical
disease or defect, or when a physician or psychologist designated by the
director finds that a person committed to the department suffers from a
mental disease or defect, the chief executive officer may order such per-
son to be segregated from other persons in the facility. If the physician or
psychologist is of the opinion that the person cannot be given proper
treatment in that facility, the director may arrange for his transfer for ex-
amination, study, and treatment to any medical-correctional facility, or to
another institution in the Department of Public Institutions where proper
treatment is available. A person who is so transferred shall remain sub-
ject to the jurisdiction and custody of the Department of Correctional
Services and shall be returned to the department when, prior to the expi-
ration of his sentence, treatment in such facility is no longer necessary.
Id.
36. 445 U.S. at 495.
37. Id. at 491-94.
38. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
39. For evidence of a reduction in the number of states requiring automatic
commitment, see Commitment and Release of Persons Found Not Guilty by Rea-
son of Insanity: A Georgia Perspective, 15 GA. L. REV. 1065, 1090-91 (1981). See
also Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity and the Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 924 (1968).
the reform or abolition of the defense. 40
Against this backdrop, the Jones case found its way to the
Supreme Court. In what appears to be an assurance that insanity
acquittees like Hinckley will not escape confinement, the
Supreme Court held that a defendant acquitted by reason of in-
sanity could be involuntarily committed to a mental institution
for an indefinite period on the sole basis of his insanity acquital. 41
III. FACTUAL HISTORY
On September 19, 1975, Michael Jones was arrested for attempt-
ing to steal a jacket from a department store. He was first admit-
ted to St. Elizabeth's, a hospital for the mentally ill, because of a
court-ordered competency examination. 42 On March 12, 1976, on
stipulated facts as to the crime and insanity, Jones was found not
guilty by reason of insanity. On May 25, 1976, the hearing (re-
quired within fifty days of the commitment by District of Colum-
bia Code Annotated section 24-301(d) (2) (A) ),43 was held, and
because he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was no longer mentally ill or dangerous to himself or
others, Jones remained confined at St. Elizabeth's."
A second release hearing was held on February 22, 1977, at
which Jones raised the argument that his confinement under sec-
tion 301(d) could not extend beyond his hypothetical maximum
sentence and that he was therefore entitled to release or civil
commitment under District of Columbia Code Annotated section
21-545(b). 45 Jones' motion for release or civil commitment was
40. 7 MENTAL DisAB. L. REP. 136, 137 (1983).
41. 103 S. Ct. at 3050.
42. The psychologist's report stated that Jones was competent to stand trial,
"but that he had signs and symptoms of a severe mental disorder, including audi-
tory hallucinations, and that he should be hospitalized at St. Elizabeth's for treat-
ment." Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364, 368 n.3 (D.C. 1981).
43. See supra note 26.
44. 103 S. Ct. at 3047.
45. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b) provides:
If the court or jury, as the case may be, finds that the person is not men-
tally ill, the court shall dismiss the petition and order his release. If the
court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of that ill-
ness, is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at
liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate pe-
riod, or order any other alternative course of treatment which the court
believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public. The
Commission, or a member thereof, shall be competent and compellable
witnesses at a hearing or jury trial held pursuant to this chapter. The jury
to be used in any case where a jury trial is demanded under this chapter
shall be impaneled, upon order of the court, from the jurors in attendance
upon other branches of the court, who shall perform the services in addi-
tion to and as part of their duties in the court.
Id.
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later denied, and his indefinite confinement at St. Elizabeth's was
continued.46
Jones appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. A
panel of the court affirmed the finding of the Superior Court,47 but
then granted a rehearing and reversed.4 8 Finally, the court heard
the case en banc and affirmed the decision of the Superior
Court.49 The court of appeals ultimately rejected the argument
that the maximum length of prison sentence had some bearing on
Jones' release. The court also rejected the equal protection argu-
ment, and held that the differences in commitment procedures for
insanity acquittees and civil committees were justified.50
The Supreme Court granted certiorari5' and, in a five to four
opinion, affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The Court
decided that an insanity acquittal is adequate justification for
commitment,52 and that the hypothetical maximum sentence has
no bearing on the acquittee's release.53
46. 103 S. Ct. at 3047. 'Three months later, however, [Jones] was granted con-
ditional release on terms recommended by St. Elizabeths' staff, allowing daytime
and overnight visits into the community." 432 A.2d at 368 n.6.
47. Jones v. United States, 396 A.2d 183 (D.C. 1978). The court held that there
was no constitutional requirement that Jones be released or civilly committed at
the end of the maximum sentence period because that period bore no relationship
to the basis for his confinement-mental illness and dangerousness to self or
others. Id. at 189. The court also rejected Jones' equal protection argument, stat-
ing: "the difference in hearing procedures is arguably justified; there is no consti-
tutional prohibition against rational differences in the treatment of differently
situated persons." Id.
48. Jones v. United States, 411 A.2d 624 (D.C. 1980). This time the court ac-
knowledged the punitive nature of criminal commitment and held, as a matter of
equal protection vis-a-vis civil commitment, that an insanity acquittee may not be
confined for treatment beyond the maximum sentence for the underlying criminal
charge. Id. at 630-31.
Recognizing a punitive basis for criminal commitment has important constitu-
tional implications, as the Court noted in Jones:
It is questionable that confinement to a mental hospital would pass consti-
tutional muster as appropriate punishment for any crime. The insanity
defense has traditionally been viewed as premised on the notion that soci-
ety has no interest in punishing insanity acquittees, because they are
neither blameworthy nor the appropriate objects of deterrence.
103 S. Ct. at 3054 n.4. See also A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 15 (1967).
49. Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981). The court rejected the pu-
nitive rationale, concluding that Jones' confinement bore no relation to the maxi-
mum hypothetical sentence.
50. Id. at 373. The court justified the difference in the two procedures by refer-
ring back to its first panel opinion. 396 A.2d at 189.
51. 454 U.S. 1141 (1982).
52. 103 S. Ct. at 3050.
53. In its argument, the government was careful to disclaim any punitive basis
IV. THE OPINION
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, first addressed the is-
sue of whether an insanity acquittal could justify commitment. In
enacting the District of Columbia commitment statute, Congress
had determined that two facts were established by an insanity ac-
quittal: that the defendant committed an act that constitutes a
criminal offense, and that he committed the act because of mental
illness constituting an adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquit-
tee as a dangerous and mentally ill person.5 4 In a generous defer-
ral to congressional prerogative, Justice Powell wrote: "We
cannot say that it was unreasonable and therefore unconstitu-
tional for Congress to make this determination."5 5 In spite of pe-
titioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness is not
established by proof that a person committed a nonviolent crime
against property, the Court held that commission of a criminal act
"certainly indicates dangerousness ... at least as persuasive[ly]
as any predictions about dangerousness that might be made in a
civil commitment proceeding." 56 The majority further supported
Congress' determination by adopting the presumption of contin-
ued insanity, whereby a defendant who asserts that he was in-
sane at the time of the crime is presumed to be presently
insane.57
By adopting the presumptions of dangerousness and continued
insanity arising from an insanity acquittal, the Court, in essence,
equated an insanity acquittal with the findings required for civil
commitment: present mental illness and dangerousness. In what
was perhaps a recognition of the tenuous nature of these pre-
sumptions, the Court added that "the Due Process Clause does
not require Congress to make classifications that fit every individ-
ual with the same degree of relevance." 58 Referring specifically to
the presumption of continued insanity, the Court noted that a
hearing is provided within fifty days of the commitment, thereby
giving every acquittee a prompt opportunity to obtain release if
for commitment of insanity acquittees, avoiding the problem encountered in the
lower court. 103 S. Ct. at 3054.
54. See H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1970).
55. 103 S. Ct. at 3049.
56. Id. In response to Jones' argument, the Court cited Overholser v.
O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1961): "[T]o describe the theft of watches
and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usu-
ally less violent than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose
of the statute is the same as to both." The Jones Court added: "[It] may be noted
that crimes of theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the crimi-
nal to escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the flee-
ing criminal." 103 S. Ct. at 3050 n.14.
57. 103 S. Ct. at 3050.
58. Id.
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he has recovered. 59
The Court next addressed a claim by petitioner that the civil
commitment requirement of proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence established in Addington v. Texas60 had not been met in
that the proof of his insanity was based only on a preponderance
of the evidence. The Court responded by explaining that in Add-
ington the more stringent standard of proof for civil commitment
was justified by a concern that members of the public could be
confined on the basis of mere idyosyncratic behavior.6 1 This con-
cern is significantly reduced where the acquittee has himself ad-
vanced insanity as a defense and has implicitly admitted
committing a criminal act.
The final issue addressed by the Court was whether petitioner
was nonetheless entitled to his release because he had been hos-
pitalized for a period longer than he could have been incarcerated
if convicted. The Court resolved this issue by explaining that the
purpose underlying the commitment of an insanity acquittee is
different from that regarding imprisonment of a convicted crimi-
nal. The insanity acquittee is committed for treatment of the indi-
vidual's mental illness and to protect him and society from his
potential dangerousness. 62 A criminal is incarcerated for a partic-
ular length of time reflecting society's view of the proper response
to the particular crime committed. In light of this difference, the
Court held that the hypothetical maximum sentence is irrelevant:
"There simply is no necessary correllation between severity of
the offense and the length of time necessary for recovery."6 3
V. DISSENT
Four Justices disagreed with the view expressed in the majority
opinion: Justices Marshall and Blackmun, who joined Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion, and Justice Stevens who dissented
separately.
59. See supra note 24.
60. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). The Supreme Court held that a "clear and convincing"
standard of proof is required by the fourteenth amendment in a civil proceeding
brought under state law to involuntarily commit an individual for an indefinite pe-
riod of time. Id. at 433.
61. Id. at 427.
62. 103 S. Ct. at 3051.
63. Id. at 3052. Thus, the Court adopted the approach originally taken by the
court of appeals.
Justice Brennan's dissent began by chastising the majority for
posing the wrong question:
The issue in this case is not whether petitioner must be released because
he has been hospitalized for longer than the prison sentence he might
have served had he been convicted.... [but] whether the fact that an in-
dividual has been found not guilty by reason of insanity by itself provides
a constitutionally adequate basis for involuntary, indefinite commitment
to psychiatric hospitalization.64
Justice Brennan attacked the majority's holding that a finding
of insanity at a criminal trial "is sufficiently probative of mental
illness and dangerousness to justify commitment." 65 Despite
their superficial appeal, the presumptions of continuing insanity
and dangerousness could not, he argued, excuse the government
from satisfying the Addington burden of proof with respect to
present mental illness and dangerousness in committing peti-
tioner for an indefinite period.66
The dissent examined precedents in other commitment con-
texts and found them to be inconsistent with the argument that
the mere facts of past criminal behavior and mental illness justify
indefinite commitment without the procedural benefits afforded
persons undergoing civil commitment. 67 Justice Brennan pointed
out that the government's interests in committing the insanity ac-
quittee are the same interests involved in civil commitments-iso-
lation, protection, and treatment of a person who poses a danger
to himself or others. In those civil commitment cases, particularly
Addington, the individual's interest in liberty required the gov-
ernment to bear the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing
evidence.68 The minority in Jones simply felt that even for some-
one who has implicitly admitted committing a criminal act, the
findings embodied in an insanity acquittal are not an adequate
substitute for the due process protections afforded civil
committees.69
Justice Brennan saw serious problems with the majority's
equation of an insanity acquittal with the findings required for in-
voluntary civil commitment-present mental illness and danger-
ousness. An insanity acquittal, he argued, is "backward looking,
focusing on one moment in the past, while commitment requires
64. Id. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 3049.
66. Id. at 3055.
67. The most significant of these protections is the government's bearing the
burden of proof with respect to present mental illness and dangerousness.
68. 441 U.S. at 433. See supra note 60.
69. Since the government disclaimed any punitive rationale for Jones' commit-
ment, the dissent believed the only alternative was commitment according to the
constitutional procedures developed in accordance with due process principles.
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a judgment as to the present and future."70 Although the majority
had made an attempt to overcome this disparity through the use
of the presumptions of dangerousness and continued insanity,
Justice Brennan responded by noting the difficulty that mental
health professionals have in predicting whether any one person
will be dangerous.71 He added:
Research is practically nonexistent on the relationship of non-violent
criminal behavior, such as petitioner's attempt to shoplift, to future dan-
gerousness. We do not even know whether it is even statistically valid as
a predictor of similar non-violent behavior, much less of behavior posing
more serious risks to self and others.
7 2
On the issue of continued insanity, Justice Brennan explained:
"As for mental illness, certainly some conditions that satisfy the
'mental disease' element of the insanity defense do not persist for
an extended period."73 Since the elements of an insanity defense
required only: (1) mental illness at the time of the crime; and (2)
causation between the mental illness and the crime,74 the dissent
argued that an insanity acquittal cannot legitimately excuse the
government from the burden of proving that the acquittee is pres-
ently mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others.75
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens implicitly accepted a pu-
nitive rationale for confining the insanity acquittee: "A plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity ... may provide a sufficient basis for
confinement for the period fixed by the legislature as punishment
for the acknowledged conduct .... -76 If the acquittee is to be
confined for a longer period, he argued, the state must civilly com-
mit him.77
70. 103 S. Ct. at 3056 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court further noted that,
in some jurisdictions, including federal courts, an acquittal by reason of insanity
may mean only that a jury found a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity and
as to the causal relationship between his mental condition and his crime. See Da-
vis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
71. 103 S. Ct. at 3057 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3058. For medical information on the rapid action of the major tran-
quilizers, see L. KOLB & A. NOYES, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 623-24 (12th ed.
1980); S. ARIETI, AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 444 (2d ed. 1975).
74. The District of Columbia uses the ALI insanity test. See supra note 2.
75. 103 S. Ct. at 3061 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' analysis thus paralleled that
of the court of appeals. Stevens went so far as to characterize Jones' commitment
as "incarceration." Id.
77. Id.
VI. ANALYSIS
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the real issue in
this case was whether the successful assertion of the insanity de-
fense can, by itself, justify the acquittee's indefinite commitment
to a mental hospital.7 8 In its analysis of this issue, the majority
conspicuously disregarded several significant Supreme Court de-
cisions 79 bearing on the acquittee's due process and equal protec-
tion rights, in favor of a generous deferral to Congress' fear that
"dangerous criminals, particularly psychopaths" would use the
defense to escape confinement entirely.80 By adopting two pre-
sumptions8 of dubious validity, the majority attempted to diffuse
petitioner's due process argument by equating the elements of an
insanity acquittal with the findings required for involuntary civil
commitment.
A. Presumption of Dangerousness
The majority stated: "The fact that a person has been found, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act cer-
tainly indicates dangerousness." 82 While superficially appealing,
this proposition is in direct contradiction to Supreme Court prece-
dent, statistically unfounded and, therefore, constitutionally
inadequate.
The majority seems to have disregarded an important principle
found in Baxstrom. There, the Supreme Court held that the com-
mission of a criminal act did not give rise to a presumption of
dangerousness which could justify a difference in commitment
procedures. 83 In discussing "dangerousness," the Court surpris-
ingly made no mention of Baxstrom. Instead, the most persua-
sive support it could muster for its holding on this issue was that
"courts should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative
78. Once this issue is resolved in favor of upholding the insanity acquittee's
initial commitment independent of any punitive rationale, the length of sentence
becomes irrelevant.
79. See supra note 20.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 3049. See also H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
81. One is the presumption of continuing insanity. The other is the presump-
tion of dangerousness arising from the fact that the defendant committed a crimi-
nal act.
82. 103 S. Ct. at 3049.
83. 383 U.S. at 114. In Baxstrom, the Court held:
Where the State has provided for a judicial proceeding to determine the
dangerous propensities of all others civilly committed to an institution of
the Department of Correction, it may not deny this right to a person in
Baxstrom's position solely on the ground that he was nearing the expira-
tion of a prison term.
Id. See also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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judgments."84
Not only is the presumption of dangerousness in conflict with
Baxstrom, it also appears to lack medical support. A long-term
study of criminally insane patients who were released as a result
of a federal court decision in Pennsylvania concluded: "In any
proportion of the criminally insane, the proportion who would re-
petitively commit serious violent acts is quite small and the over-
all policy concerning the treatment of the criminally insane
should not be based on the behavior of this small group."85
A study done in New York provided similar results. Nine hun-
dred sixty-nine prisoner patients were transferred to civil hospi-
tals as a result of a court decision. Psychiatrists had determined
that these patients were too dangerous for such transfers. Never-
theless, less than one percent actually proved to be dangerous.8 6
These statistics certainly do not prove that insanity acquittees
are not dangerous. These studies do, however, raise questions
about the constitutional validity of the presumption of dangerous-
ness, particularly in the complete absence of studies which sup-
port a contrary position.
The Supreme Court has set explicit standards which a statutory
presumption must satisfy in order to "pass constitutional mus-
ter."87 "[It must be shown with] substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact
on which it is made to depend."88 Civil cases have also held that
it is arbitrary and unconstitutional to deprive an individual of ex-
isting rights on the basis of a presumption which may be gener-
ally true of persons in the individual's class. 89
84. 103 S. Ct. at 3050 n.13. The dissent noted the weakness of the majority's
analysis of the dangerousness issue, stating: "[A] State may consider non-violent
misdemeanors 'dangerous,' but there is room for doubt whether a single attempt
to shoplift and a string of brutal murders are equally accurate and equally perma-
nent predictors of dangerousness." Id. at 3058. The dissent stated further: "It is
difficult to see how the Court's generalization justifies relieving the Government of
its Addington-O'Connor burden of proving present dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence." 103 S. Ct. at 3058 n.13.
85. THORNBERRY & JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: A COMMUNITY FoLLowup
OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS 210 (1980).
86. Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY
974 (1968).
87. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 32-36 (1969).
88. Id. at 36.
89. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644-46 (1974) (a woman, five
months pregnant cannot teach safely or effectively); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
443 (1973) (university student is not a resident of the city where he attends school
The studies noted above indicate that the presumption of dan-
gerousness arising from past criminal conduct fails this constitu-
tional test. While criminal conduct is certainly of some
evidentiary value in assessing a person's dangerousness, nonvio-
lent criminal behavior does not seem to evince the dangerousness
required for involuntary commitment. It is hardly the "persuasive
evidence" the majority claimed it to be, and it is certainly not so
conclusive as to justify the Court's excusing the state from prov-
ing the insanity acquittee's dangerousness prior to indefinite
commitment.
B. Presumption of Continuing Insanity
At first glance, the majority's justification for the presumption
of continued insanity appears reasonable. The conclusion that
"someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to com-
mit a criminal act is likely to remain ill,"90 indeed seems to com-
port with common sense. The presumption, however, becomes
more fiction than fact as the time between the commission of the
crime and the trial increases.
Often, many months pass between the time of the act and the
time of trial. If the defendant has been found incompetent to
stand trial, this time is most often spent undergoing treatment in
a mental hospital. Today, through the administration of psycho-
tropic medications, dramatic relief from serious psychotic symp-
toms can be achieved within a matter of weeks.91 Further, as the
minority noted: "[C]ertainly some conditions that satisfy the
'mental disease' element of the insanity defense do not persist for
an extended period."92
The majority attempted to minimize the ultimate effect of the
inference of continuing mental illness by reference to the fact
that a hearing is provided within fifty days of the commitment at
which the acquittee has an opportunity to obtain release if he has
recovered.93 In offering the fifty-day hearing as an alternative de-
if he was a nonresident at the time of application); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (unwed father is unfit parent). But see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767-
73 (1975) (nine month duration-of-relationship requirement to prevent the use of
sham marriages to secure social security payment held constitutional).
90. 103 S. Ct. at 3050.
91. See supra note 73.
92. 103 S. Ct. at 3058.
93. Under section 24-301(d) (2) (see supra note 26), instead of the state bearing
the burden of proving that the individual is presently mentally ill, as due process
requires for civil commitment, the insanity acquittee finds himself confined sub-
ject to his ability to prove that he is no longer insane. A shift in the burden of
proof, under these circumstances, is often outcome-determinative. See Waite v.
Jacobs, 475 F.2d 392, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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termination of present mental illness, the Court ignored the sig-
nificance of a shift in the burden of proof where insanity is at
issue.
The only justification offered by the Court for its holding on this
issue was that the inference of continued insanity "comports with
common sense."94 The Court supported its finding on due process
grounds with a reference to the fact that "legislative classifica-
tions need not be perfect."95 However, while the rational basis
analysis may not always require perfect classifications, it is clear
that accurate classifications are needed where an individual's lib-
erty is at stake.
C. Length of Commitment
Once the Court justified the initial commitment of the insanity
acquittee wholly apart from any punitive rationale, it followed
that the hypothetical maximum sentence would have no bearing
on the patient's release. The Court easily distinguished the fac-
tors underlying imprisonment and commitment and held that the
patient's release would have nothing to do with the possible sen-
tence for conviction of the crime, but would depend solely on
whether or not he had recovered.96
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the length of sen-
tence did have some bearing on the patient's release.9 7 This con-
clusion can only be reached, however, if one acknowledges a
punitive basis for the acquittee's initial confinement. While a pu-
nitive treatment of the insanity acquittee would seem to clash
with the very nature of the defense,98 there has been a recent
movement to deemphasize the concept of "lack of criminal re-
sponsibility," and to allow the court to sentence the insanity ac-
quittee to a prison term.99 Justice Stevens' approach would
similarly allow punishment of the insanity acquittee for the maxi-
94. 103 S. Ct. at 3050.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3052.
97. Id. at 3061 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. The insanity defense is based on the principle that some offenders, be-
cause of mental illness, are not criminally responsible and, therefore, are not
proper subjects for punishment. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 6-11
(1967).
99. See Sherman, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Retreat from the Insanity Defense,
7 Am. J. OF LAW & MED. 237 (1981).
mum sentence period, subject to the acquittee's proving that he
has recovered.
While the government and the majority contended that the Dis-
trict of Columbia commitment statute lacked any punitive basis,
close scrutiny of the statute and its practical effects compels a dif-
ferent conclusion. A statute motivated by a congressional fear
that dangerous criminals may escape confinement, and which al-
lows the District to commit the acquittee without ever proving his
present mental illness and dangerousness, must be based at least
in part on a punitive rationale. Recognition of this fact renders
Justice Stevens' contention valid-the length of sentence should
indicate the time at which the acquittee would have to be re-
leased or committed pursuant to the civil commitment
procedures.
VII. IMPACT
The immediate impact of the Jones decision will not be great.
By finding the District of Columbia's mandatory commitment
statute'00 constitutional, the Supreme Court has expressed judi-
cial approval of the most restrictive, in terms of due process, of
the four types of commitment schemes.'10
The long term impact of the decision, however, may be of much
greater significance. As legislatures across the country consider
proposals to reform or abolish the insanity defense, they will do
so with the knowledge that the Supreme Court has given them
free reign concerning the disposition of the insanity acquittee. If
the legislatures respond to the public's fear that "dangerous
criminals will go free" as a result of the defense, mandatory com-
mitment of insanity acquittees may become the rule. The efficacy
of the defense itself could disappear as the difference between
"imprisonment" and "hospitalization" becomes increasingly
insignificant.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Court appears to have succumbed to the ideological com-
plexities of the insanity defense. It should seem fairly clear that a
person who is acquitted is entitled to his freedom unless the state
can justify his confinement on some other basis. If the punitive
motivations for commitment are completely disregarded, then the
insanity acquittee stands in relatively the same position as any
other candidate for involuntary civil commitment and should be
100. See supra note 8.
101. See supra note 4.
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afforded the same procedural safeguards. While an insanity ac-
quittal may provide that the defendant should be institutionalized
for the benefit of himself and the public, the criminal trial does
not conclusively satisfy the due process requirements for such an
infringement on the acquittee's right to liberty. When the crimi-
nal conduct involved is a non-violent crime, the trial has no real
bearing on either the defendant's dangerousness to himself or
others or, as in this case, on the insanity acquittal as a basis for
involuntary confinement.
The majority seems to have been motivated by a concern that
there will be defendants who can obtain an insanity acquittal, but
for whom the state will not be able to satisfy civil commitment re-
quirements. While this is admittedly a difficulty created by the
insanity defense as it is currently implemented in most jurisdic-
tions, the solution does not lie in the elimination of the require-
ments for commitment.102 If it is too difficult to accept the
proposition that the insanity acquittee may escape confinement,
then the solution is reform of the insanity defense. Congress, and
now the Supreme Court, have merely mistreated a symptom in
their tacitly punitive and constitutionally inadequate disposition
of the insanity acquittee.
PAUL S. AVILLA
102. For discussion of the problems with the insanity defense, see generally,
WINSDALE AND Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA (1983); N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1982).

